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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is seven years old. After a number of 
delays and superficial rulings, Judge Moffat granted summary 
judgment for Memorial Estates. The trouble is that he didn't 
bother to read the file. The summary judgment was granted on 
the broadest possible grounds. 
Because of the unusual treatment in the trial court, 
Schoney was required to brief all possible theories in this 
complex case. Because of a computer failure, Schoney's final 
79-page brief was delayed. This Court struck the 79-page brief 
and received, instead,a 30-page preliminary draft brief. 
However, the 30-page brief did not include treatment 
of the class issues. Therefore, by striking the 79-page final 
brief, this Court effectively dismissed a putative class. Such 
a dismissal violates due process standards established by the 
United States Supreme Court, as well as Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e), which states: 
1 
A class action may not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the 
Court, and notice of the proposed dismissal 
or compromise shall be given to all members 




DUE PROCESS CONCERNS HAVE ARISEN IN THIS CASE 
A. Introduction 
This will not be a traditional reply brief. The 
procedural history of this case is so unusual that a 
traditional brief is not possible. 
Specifically, recent rulings of this Court raise 
serious due process issues. Schoney is obligated to advise the 
Court of such due process issues at the earliest possible time. 
See Sparrow v. Reynolds, 646 F. Supp.v (D.C.D.C. 1986); C£. 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975 
(1967). 
Furthermore, error is often cumulative. See In Re: 
Santrucek, 145 N.E. 739 (1924) (per Justice Cardozo); Allett v. 
Hill, 422 So.2d 1047 (Fla.App. 1982); Wiedower v. ACF 
Industries, 763 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo.App. 1988). Therefore this 
reply brief will present the due process issue in the context 
of the overall case. 
2 
B. Delay 
This case was filed on June 14, 1982. The case has 
been set and reset for trial six times! Schoney was 
responsible for one continuance due to a change in staff. (R. 
510-513-) The other continuances were granted for the 
convenience of the court or the convenience of Memorial 
Estates, Several of the delays were from first place trial 
settings. (See Chronology at Brief of Appellant, p. 8-9.) 
Twice Schoney sought assignment of a special judge to avoid 
such delays. (R. 522, 1085.) Neither request was granted. 
If this case is remanded, it will likely take another 
year to get on the trial calendar, and perhaps two years to 
process an appeal from the trial. When the Schoneys first 
walked into a lawyer's office seven years ago, little did they 
realize that it would take a decade to process their modest 
claim. 
C. Class Certification and Motions to Enlarge the Class 
Early in the litigation, the trial court judge 
(Fishier) certified the case to proceed as a class action. (R. 
186, 202-204.) 
3 
The original class certification was based upon 
rather narrow theories. (See R. 202-204.) Therefore, Schoney 
made a motion to enlarge the class to include the additional 
theories and additional parties. (R. 278.) At about the same 
time, Memorial Estates made a motion to decertify the class. 
(R. 487.) 
Judge Dee ruled first on the decertification motion. 
(R. 726, p. 1 & 2.) Judge Dee granted that motion to decertify 
the class. •*• Next, Judge Dee entertained arguments on the 
motion to enlarge the class.^ (R. 726, p. 1-3.) 
1
 The theory of liability was that Memorial Estates 
sold space in non-existent mausoleums, and that Memorial 
Estates delayed construction for up to ten years. (See R. 2.) 
Judge Dee limited the potential class to 26 persons. 
Apparently only 26 persons signed the same form of contract as 
Schoneys. 
Even though the contract form changed slightly, 
Schoney presented nearly 300 contracts from customers who were 
victims of the same course of conduct. (R. 727-991.) 
As a part of that same scheme, Memorial Estates 
issued deeds in non-existent mausoleums. Schoney identified 68 
identical deeds for Mountain View and 147 identical deeds for 
Redwood. (R. 628-629.) 
z
 Since the class was then decertified, Schoney 
verbally amended the Motion to Enlarge the Class, to be a 
Motion to Recertify the Class based upon the new theories of 
liability. (See R. 726 at p. 3.) 
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Memorial Estates argued that the Motion to Enlarge 
the Class presented no new theories. 
MR- SWOPE: Your Honor, it's in the 
Amended Complaint, the Second Amended 
Complaint, which has been before this Court 
since June 1983, Count V, Breach of 
Contract to Provide Chapel. It's been 
before the Court. Count VI, Breach of 
Trust. It's been before the Court. Count 
VII, Breach of Statutory Trust. It's been 
before the Court. Count VIII, Invasion of 
Trust Corpus. Count X, Failure to 
Establish a Statutory Trust. All these 
have been before the Court. These are not 
new issues. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 726, p. 8.) 
The Court agreed with Memorial Estates. The Court denied 
the Motion to Enlarge the Class. However, the Court's ruling 
did not go to the merits. The Court simply concluded that the 
Motion to Enlarge the Class had already been considered: 
And the date of my decision (to decertify 
the class) being last Tuesday covers all of 
the things that have been done so far. . . 
So I've considered all of these new 
theories, and I am denying your Motion to 
Enlarge the Class for the three theories, 
which are not new theories. They have 
already been considered. They are in 
writing in the file. And I'm decertifying 
the class. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 726, p. 11-12.) 
In short, Judge Dee (second judge) simply side-
stepped the issue. It is abundantly clear that the Motion to 
5 
Decertify the Class presents wholly different issues from the 
Motion to Enlarge the Class. (Compare R. 202-204; R. 280-285; 
and R. 487-492.) Rather Judge Dee (second judge) simply 
followed the misleading statement of Memorial Estates' 
counsel.3 
D. Repeated Application For Summary Judgment 
After waiting literally six years to get a trial 
date (See para. B above) and after the class was dismissed 
under unusual circumstances (See C above), the eve of the 
trial finally approached. By now a third judge was on the 
scene (Moffat). 
Memorial Estates filed a motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 1363.) The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. 
(R. 137 7.) This appeal followed. 
The problem is that this was Memorial Estates' third 
try at summary judgment. Twice before Memorial Estates had 
filed — and lost summary judgment motions. (R. 700 and 
R. 1301.) The third Motion for Summary Judgment was in all 
material respects exactly the same as the first two motions for 
summary judgment. (Compare R. 472; R. 1200; and R. 1363.) 
* [Mr. Swope for Memorial Estates] 
"All these have been before the Court. These are not new 
theories." (R. 726, p. 8.) 
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In short, Memorial Estates' judge shopping finally 
paid off and they found a judge who would agree with their 
theories. The problem is that such judge shopping is a square 
violation of §78-7-19, Utah Code Ann. 
If an application for an order. . . is 
refused in whole or in part. . . no 
subsequent application for the same order 
can be made to any other judge, except of a 
higher court. 
E. Failure to Review the Record 
Undaunted by the fact that the same motion had been 
heard on two prior occasions, (See Para. D above) Judge Moffat 
forged ahead. The problem is that Judge Moffat didn't bother 
with the nicety of reading the file. After two other judges 
had managed this complex case for over six years, Judge Moffat 
casually mentioned: 
We have a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Haven't had a chance to look at 
the file. . . 
(June 21, 1988 Transcript at p. 2, Lines 4-5.) 
Thus Judge Moffat could not follow his duty to, 
" . . . carefully scrutinize the submissions and contentions..." 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976). Under lesser 
circumstances, federal courts have reversed summary judgments. 
Reiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 
7 
1980); Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983). 
During the course of the summary judgment hearing, 
numerous fact issues were examined: viz. whether defendant's 
interrogatories were lost or delayed in the mail (June 21, 
1988 Tr. p. 5, Lines 18-25); whether Memorial Estates had ever 
made a suggestion of death on the Record (June 21 Tr. at p. 11, 
Lines 17-20; p. 12, Lines 10-13); whether an offer of judgment 
in the sum of $4,000 would satisfy all of Schoney's claims 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 14, Lines 7-11); whether Schoneys were 
shown a picture of the mausoleum before it was constructed 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 15, Lines 2-13); whether the Schoneys were 
shown a rendering of a mausoleum at Redwood Road or Mountain 
View (June 21 Tr. at p. 16, Lines 20-25); whether the 
mausoleums at Mountain View and Redwood Road were substantially 
the same (June 21 Tr. at p. 17, Lines 11-15); whether the 
construction of a mausoleum at Redwood Road put the Schoneys on 
notice that a later mausoleum at Mountain View would be of the 
same quality (June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Lines 6-10); whether a 
chapel has always been available at Mountain View (June 21 Tr. 
at p. 18, Line 22 - p. 19, Line 5); whether it was reasonable 
for Schoneys to purchase an alternate mausoleum space (at 
Sunset Lawn) (June 21 Tr. at p. 27); whether Memorial Estates 
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sold more crypts than had been constructed (June 21 Tr. at p. 
31, Lines 1-4); whether the Schoneys purchased a mausoleum at 
Redwood Road or Mountain View (June 21 Tr, at p. 36 and 37); 
whether Memorial Estates properly accounted for trust funds 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 4 3, Lines 8-22); whether Memorial Estates 
held a dead corpse as a hostage (June 21 Tr. at p. 4 6, Lines 
1-9); whether Memorial Estates told Schoneys that their money 
would be held in trust (June 21 Tr. at p. 46, Lines 10-19); 
whether Memorial Estates represented that a mausoleum would be 
built when there were no plans to do so (June 21 Tr. at p. 47, 
Lines 1-7); whether it was reasonable for Memorial Estates to 
substitute an LDS chapel for the Schoneys, who were a non-LDS 
family (June 21 Tr. at p. 48, Lines 12-22); whether a chapel 
was available at both Mountain View and Redwood Road (June 21 
Tr. at p. 51, Lines 1-3); whether Memorial Estates was 
prejudiced^ because Schoney answered interrogatories 
approximately 15 days late.^ (June 21 Tr. at p. 5, Lines 1-
15.) 
* Memorial Estates was guilty of numerous discovery 
delays much more serious than 15 days. (See Brief of Appellant 
at p. 7.) 
5 Memorial Estates argued that the case of W.W. & W. B. 
Gardner v. Parkwest Valley, 568 P.2d 734 justified dismissal as 
a sanction. (June 21 Tr. at p. 4-5.) Without reading the 
case, Judge Moffat held tiiat the Gardner case "requires" 
dismissal. (June 21 Tr. at 51.) 
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In summary, it was clear error for Judge Moffat to 
grant summary judgment in such a complicated case, and in face 
of numerous fact issues, without even reading the file. 
F. Refusal to Permit Schoneys to File a Complete Brief 
After losing in the trial court, Schoneys appealed. 
The legal theories were numerous and complex. At the 
conclusion of oral argument, Judge Moffat stated: 
I think Mr. Peck's motions are well taken 
in every instance. . . 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 51.) 
That simple statement covers a lot of territory. Such a 
shotgun ruling, " . . . made without a deliberate articulation 
of its rationale, including some appraisal of the factors 
underlying the court's decision [does not] allow for a 
disciplined and informed review of the Court's discretion." 
Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978). Compare 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.° in short, Schoney 
was left to brief all possible issues in a very complex case. 
b
 "The Court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules . . . 56. . . when the motion is based on more than 
one ground." 
10 
Schoney filed a 30 page preliminary draft brief, and 
moved for an additional five working days to file the final 
brief. The grounds for the motion were that the word 
processing equipment had broken down. (Motion and Order to 
File Brief with Leave to File Substitute Brief, dated February 
10, 1989.) That motion was denied. (Order, dated March 7, 
1989. ) See Exhibit A. 
With one exception, Schoney does not wish to reargue 
the substance of that order — nor would it be proper to do so. 
However, one aspect of that order raises due process concerns. 
Schoneys filed a 30 page preliminary draft brief. 
In connection with that filing, Schoney specifically noted 
that: 
Appellant's counsel has prepared a brief 
and motion to file with leave to substitute 
Exhibits A and B hereto are drafts of both. 
The draft of the brief is not the current 
one; the current one is in the word 
processor memory. At about 9:00 a.m. 
today, February 10, 1989, the office 
printer broke down. . .(Emphasis added.) 
(Motion to File Brief with Leave to File Substitute Brief, 
dated February 10, 1989.) The motion was attested by the 
manager of the word processing department. 
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This Court's order of March 7, 1989 did not permit 
Schoney to file the version of the brief that was finished— 
albeit locked in a broken down computer. Rather, this Court's 
order stated: 
It is further ORDERED that the draft brief 
filed on 10 February, 1989 shall comprise 
Appellant's Brief. Appellant shall have 
the draft bound and shall file the bound 
brief before 10 March, 1989. 
(Order, 7 March, 1989.) 
In summary, Schoney was faced with an awesome task to 
summarize six years of litigation in a final appellate brief. 
The task was especially difficult because of the superficial 
treatment of issues, and shotgun rulings below. (See Para. C, 
D, E, above.) Schoney had in fact written a complete brief.7 
However, because of an equipment failure, Schoneys were not 
permitted to file that complete brief. 
G. Dissolution of Class 
The 30 page brief filed on February 10 did not 
include a treatment of class issues. The final 79 page brief, 
1
 Schoney believes that the Brief which was locked in 
the computer on February 10, 1989 was, in fact, the 79 page 
Brief dated 21 February, 1989 (which was rejected by this 
Court.) However, the attorney in charge of the file has been 
fired for his mishandling this appeal. Thus, it may not be 
possible to reconstruct exactly what was in the computer on 
February 10, 1989. 
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which was rejected by this Court, did include a treatment of 
the class issues. 
Without regard to fault or error,° the result is that 
the putative class has disappeared. However, that violates 
due process rights of the putative class members. 
An elementary and fundamental requirement 
of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306; 70 
S.Ct. 652 (1950). 
Although Mullane was not a class action, it provides 
the due process touchstone for all class actions, see Phillips 
Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 012 (1985). In order to 
implement those due process considerations, Rule 23(e) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
° This Court apparently views the issue as being 
Schoney's fault for trying to make substantive changes after a 
brief was filed pursuant to the Court's "Lodging Policy". See 
Order, 7 March, 1989. On the other hand, Schoney views the 
issue as clear error. Schoney contends that the February 10, 
1989 filing had nothing to do with the "Lodging Policy". (That 
policy has never been promulgated.) Rather, it was a garden 
variety showing of "good cause" for an enlargement of time 
pursuant to Rule 22(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
(See Schoneys' Motion for Review, dated 9 March, 19 89.) 
13 
A class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the 
Courtr and notice of the dismissal or 
compromise shall be given to all members of 
the class in such manner as the court 
directs. (Emphasis added.) 
Due process considerations require that Rule 23(e) 
should apply even where the class has not been certified if 
there is any prejudice to absent class members. Simer v. Rios, 
661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981). 
In this case, absent class members are prejudiced 
because they might choose to file individual claims if they 
were aware that the class was dissolved* Furthermore, this 
Court has failed to even consider Rule 23(e) in connection with 
the dismissal (or dissolution) of the class.^ 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
This case has been fraught with delay and superficial 
treatment by the trial court. The cumulative error required 
Schoney to write a far reaching brief on every possible aspect 
9 it is no solution for the Court to simply blame 
Schoney's counsel. Due process requires that the named 
plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of 
the class. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 
(1985) . 
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of the case, Schoney accomplished that formidable task in a 
reasonable time. Because of equipment failure the final draft 
of the brief was delayed. This Court struck Schoney's final 
brief, and with that ruling the class also fell. 
The totality of these circumstances has deprived 
putative class members as well as Schoney of their due process 
rights. 
The only solution is to remand to the trial court for 
total reprocessing of the class issues and the summary judgment 
issues. 
DATED t h i s <£o day of 1989 
ROBERT J . DEBtar & ASSOCIATES 
A t t o r n e y s f o r / A p p e l l < 
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The lodging policy in effect in February 1989, provided 
appellant five additional working days to correct technical 
defects and to file a substitute brief. Appellant failed to file 
a substitute brief within the five day period. By correspondence 
dated 16 February 1989, the Court notified appellant that the 
brief was in default and that the appeal could be dismissed 
unless a substitute brief was filed by 24 February 1989. 
Appellants substitute brief was filed on 21 February 
1989. The briof^ exclusive of the table of contents, table of 
authorities and appendix, is 79 pages in length. Appellant1s 
corrections go to the substance of the brief as well as to 
defects which may be addressed under the lodging policy. Thus, 
the substitute brief is improper. 
Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that appellant*a 
Motion To File Cverlongth Brief is denied. It is further ORDERED 
that the draft brief filed on 10 February 1989 shall comprise 
appellants brief. Appellant shall have the draft bound and 
shall file the bound brief, together with seven copies, on or 
before 10 March 19ft3. Although the* cverlength brief is not: 
accepted, the Appendix To Appellant's Brief, filed 21 February 
1989, is accepted. 
***** w **"»** %*w««<» -^m 
- — 0 0 O 0 0 — — 
George K« Schoney and 
Erma J. Schoney, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v, 
Memorial Estates, inc., 
Defendants and Respondents, 
ORDER 
Case No* 880630-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon (a) appellant's 
several motions for extensions to file appellant's brief, (b) 
appellant's Motion To File Overlength Brief, filed 21 February 
1939, (c) respondent's Motion To Dismiss, filed 21 February 1989 
and (d) appellant's Motion To Refer Motion To Dismiss, filad 1 
March 1989-
On 10 February 1989, appellant filed a 20 page brief, in 
draft form, together with a Motion To File Brief With Leave To 
File Substitute Biief. Thereafter, on 21 February 3 989, 
appellant filed a Motion To Extend Time For Filing Substitute 
Brief and a Motion To File Overlength Brief* 
The substitute bri^f was filed pjrsuant to the Court's 
internal policy for lodging briefs• The purpose of the policy is 
to permit a party, who makes a good faith effort to timely file a 
brief, extra time to correct technical defects in the brief• 
Technical defects include improper covers, inadequate binding or 
lack of binding, incorrect pagination, and etc. The lodging 
policy does not provide an opportunity to amend the substance of 
the arguments contained in the brief. ^^^ fT^^Ny 
Page 3 
It is also ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss is 
denied. Respondent's brief shall be due thirty days from 10 
March 1989. That is, respondent shall file its brief on or before 
9 April 1989. Further/ it is ORDERED that appellant's Motion To 
Refer Motion To Dismiss is denied. 
Dated this " 7 ^ * day of March 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Russell W. Bench 
